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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-
ARREST-MOTOR VEHICLE EXCEPTION TO
WARRANT REQUIREMENT-LIMITS?
People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d. 871, 512 P.2d 1208,
109 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1973).
If penal law is weak or ineffective, basic human interests are
in jeopardy. If it is harsh or arbitrary in its impact, it works
a gross injustice on those caught within its toils. The law
that carries such responsibilities should surely be as rational
and just as law can be. Nowhere in the entire legal field is
more at stake for the community or for the individual.'
O N MAY 11, 1970, officers of the Los Angeles Police Department
approached the apartment of Clay Dumas. Based on a report from
a reliable informant, whose information had been corroborated by
independent police investigation, the police had obtained a warrant to
search Dumas' apartment and "all trash cans, storage areas, garages and
carports which are assigned to and/or used by occupants of the aforesaid
apartment." 2 The objects of the search were certain stolen bonds and bank
checks which, according to the police informant, Dumas had been in
possession of for about eight weeks; also narcotics and narcotics gear.
The police "forcibly entered without announcing their authority or
purpose,"'3 finding Dumas, who they immediately arrested, and a young
woman. The following search failed to uncover the contraband but
revealed a set of car keys and an automobile registration certificate
belonging to a car parked in the street about 100 feet from Dumas'
apartment building. An immediate search of the car's trunk revealed
the stolen securities and some narcotics.
Dumas appealed his conviction of receiving stolen property, basing
his appeal on the Superior Court's denial of his motion to suppress
I Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 H~Av. L. REv. 1097, 1098 (1952).
2 People v. Dumas, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 307 (1973).
3 Id. The informant had reported that Dumas always answered the door with a loaded
gun in his hand. The court held that this knowledge, combined with no occurrences
at the scene which allayed the officers' apprehensions, excused compliance with
California's knock and announce requirement. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1531 (West 1970).
For a survey of state statutes in this area, See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301
(1958). Since the right of privacy in a man's home seems as much damaged by a
forcible unannounced entry as by a search itself, it seems the same standard of
probable cause might apply. However, the officers in Dumas were not required to
produce any corroboration of the informant's warning. See Sabbath v. United States,
391 U.S. 585 (1968); Keiningham v. United States, 109 App. D.C. 272, 287 F.2d
126 (1960); State v. Johnson, 102 R.I. 344, 230 A.2d 831 (1967).
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the evidence seized in the search. 4 The California Supreme Court
affirmed the Superior Court conviction. After first concluding that
the warrant could not validate the search, since it described neither the
vehicle nor the site of the vehicle, the court held:
[T]he police officers had probable cause to search defendant's
automobile under unforeseeable circumstances in which the securing
of a warrant was impracticable. The search was consequently reason-
able, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion
to suppress the evidence discovered therein.5 (Emphasis added).
Analysis must begin with the fourth amendment's prohibition against
"unreasonable searches and seizures," 6 extended to the states in 1961 by
Mapp v. Ohio.7 The language of the fourth amendment at least impliedly
states a preference for searches pursuant to a warrant, and searches with-
out a warrant are presumed unreasonable, subject to certain recognized
exceptions.8 Determination of whether the search of Dumas' automobile
was pursuant to a search warrant centers on the fourth amendment's
requirement that warrants particularly describe the place to be searched.9
The court in Dumas is in accord with constitutional requirements in
holding that a warrant authorizing a search of stated premises does not
authorize the search of a vehicle, parked on the street, which is not
4 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (West 1970) provides in pertinent part:
A defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress as evidence
any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or seizure on
either of the following grounds:(1) The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.
(2) The search or seizure with a warrant was unreasonable because (i)
the warrant is insufficient on its face; (ii) the property or evidence obtained
is not that described in the warrant; (iii) there was not probable cause for the
issuance of the warrant; (iv) the method of execution of the warrant violated
federal or state constitutional standards; or (v) there was any other violation of
federal or state constitutional standards.
5 People v. Dumas, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 314 (1973).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
7 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967);
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-07 (1965); Stoner v. State of California,
376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1958);
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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mentioned or described in the warrant.1" However, it is well established
that the insufficiency of a search warrant is immaterial when the search
and seizure may be otherwise justified under one of the exceptions
normally recognized."
There are several established exceptions to the warrant requirement:
the "Carroll moving vehicle search," where exigent circumstances and
probable cause exist; 12 a search incident to a valid arrest;' 3 a search during
"hot pursuit" of a dangerous suspect; 14 border searches; 15 the seizure of
evidence in "plain view"; 16 and a search with express consent.17 Only the
first two exceptions have possible application to the search made in Dumas.
Chimel v. California,'8 which concerned the search of a home incident
to an arrest therein, limited the permissible scope of an "incident search"
to the area within the arrested person's "immediate control," defined as
the area from which the arrested person might obtain a weapon or destroy
10 United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Barton, 282
F. Supp. 785 (D. Mass. 1967); United States v. Darby, 201 F. Supp. 317 (W.D. Pa.
1962); State v. Penna, 4 Conn. Cir. 421, 233 A.2d 708 (1967); People v. Montgares,
336 Ill. 458, 168 N.E. 304 (1929); Perkins v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 916 (Ky.
1964); Haley v. State, 7 Md. App. 18, 253 A.2d 424 (1969); State v. Parsons, 83
N.J. Super. 430, 200 A.2d 340 (1964); People v. Dumper, 28 N.Y.2d 296, 270 N.E.2d
311 (1971); O'Neil v. State, 65 Okla. Crim. 398, 88 P.2d 380 (1939); Dolen v. State,
187 Tenn. 663, 216 S.W.2d 351 (1948). Contra United States v. Thoresen, 281
F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Calif. 1967) (moving van parked on street in front of described
premises containing articles taken from inside) rev'd on other grounds, 428 F.2d 654
(9th Cir. 1970). But cf. where warrants authorizing search of premises were held to
authorize search of vehicles on the premises. People v. Fitzwater, 260 Cal. App. 2d
478, 67 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 953 (1968); Alexander v. State,
108 So.2d 308 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); McCissel v. Commonwealth, 305 S.W.2d
756 (Ky. 1957); Massey v. Commonwealth, 305 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1957); Common-
wealth v. Fancy, 349 Mass. 196, 207 N.E.2d 276 (1965); Leslie v. State, 294 P.2d
854 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956); Lindley v. State, 294 P.2d 851 (Okla. Crim. App.
1956); Lawson v. State, 176 Tenn. 457, 143 S.W.2d 716 (1940).
31Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192 (1927); United States v. Jones, 204 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 854 (1953); United States v. Babich, 347 F. Supp. 157 (D. Nev. 1972),
aff'd, 477 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Lassoff, 147 F. Supp. 944
(E.D. Ky. 1957).
12 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
'3 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
'4 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
15 See Carroll v. United States, 276 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925).
'6Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968). The seizure of evidence in plain
view is arguably not an exception to the warrant requirement since, although a
seizure occurs, no search precedes it.
17 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). Consent searches are looked upon
with disfavor by the courts. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
18 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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evidence.19 The result was to limit the search area incident to arrest to an
"arms length" rule.20 This would seem to preclude justifying the search of
a vehicle parked 100 feet away on the street as incident to an arrest in a
home. Previous to Chimel, many searches of vehicles parked in the area
had been upheld as incident to arrest in a dwelling,21 usually because of
court confusion between the warrantless "search incident" and the
warrantless "search on probable cause plus exigent circumstances."
Chimel and Supreme Court cases subsequent to Chimel dealing with
auto searches have clarified the situation concerning what the limits of
the "search incident" are; a vehicle parked outside a dwelling in which
a defendant has been arrested and placed in police custody is outside the
defendant's "immediate control," and not subject to a search incident.22
The search of Dumas' automobile can only be justified as a warrantless
search based on the "Carroll exception" with probable cause and exigent
circumstances. The California Supreme Court found such justification
to be present.
In Carroll v. United States23 the Supreme Court first recognized as
constitutional the warrantless search of a vehicle where there exists
probable cause for the search, and "it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."24 The mobility of
the automobile was the basis for distinguishing it from homes or similar
19 Id. at 763. The search of Chimel's entire house was held to extend far beyond the
area of Chimel's "immediate control." Chimel's wife, however, was left entirely free
to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence anywhere in the house. 395 U.S. at 775
(White, J., dissenting). The court was apparently recognizing the distinction between
searches incident to arrest and searches based on probable cause and exigent
circumstances, and finding the presence of the interested third party not sufficiently
exigent to forego the warrant requirement, since footnote 9 of the majority opinion
squarely reaffirmed the Carroll mobility exception as an exigency. 395 U.S. at 764
n.9. See Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968), on the distinction
between searches incident to arrest, as opposed to automobile searches based on
probable cause plus exigent circumstances.
20W. RiGr.EL, SEARcHEs AND SEizuREs, AsRtsrs AND CoNFSmssoNs 271 (1972).
21 Browning v. United States, 366 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1966) (automobile in front of
house); People v. Fritz, 253 Cal. App. 2d 7, 61 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1967), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 910 (1968); People v. Carrigan, 213 Cal. App. 2d 607, 28 Cal. Rptr. 909
(1963); State v. Watson, 386 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. 1965) (car in front of apartment);
State v. Hoffman, 64 Wash. 2d 445, 392 P.2d 237 (1964) (car beside house). Contra
Staples v. United States, 320 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1963); Conti v. Morgenthau, 232
F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Lucas v. Mayo, 222 F. Supp. 513 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
22Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 457 n.11 (1971); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47 (1970). See also Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391
U.S. 216 (1968); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
23 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
24 Id. at 153. Squarely reaffirmed in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 n.9 (1969).
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places; the distinction was not based on any differing expectation of
privacy which owners attach to homes versus cars.u
The recent application of Carroll in the case of Chambers v.
Maroney26 has been the source of much confusion. Chambers v. Maroney
concerned the stop of a vehicle in motion on the highway and the arrest
of the occupants, followed by a careful and thorough warrantless
search of the auto at the police station. A 7-1 decision of the Supreme
Court held the search reasonable and admitted the evidence under the
probable cause plus exigent circumstances exception. Justice White for
the majority stated that probable cause was a requirement for a reasonable
search, that the police may determine probable cause where exigent
circumstances exist, and that a movable car presents exigent circumstances
justifying an immediate search if based on probable cause.27 White then
stated that a car removed to the station house still retains its mobility,
therefore exigent circumstances still exist for a warrantless search; a
warrantless "seizure" to strip the car of its alleged station house mobility,
while a search warrant is obtained, is not to be preferred over the station
house search since both are intrusions which cannot be 
distinguished. 28
The green light given the police in Chambers turned yellow in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,29 which examined more critically the
rationale for the Carroll exception, and reiterated that it justifies
the warrantless search of "an automobile stopped on the highway" where
"it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved."' 30 (Emphasis by the court). Coolidge made it clear that
the inherent mobility of the automobile is not in and of itself significant.31
25 The Carroll decision concerned a vehicle in motion on the open highway when 
it
was stopped. The court applied convincing statutory precedent: the duty collection act
of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43, passed contemporaneously with the fourth
amendment proposal, applied a relaxed warrant standard to searches for goods
"concealed in a movable vessel where they readily could be put out of reach of a
search warrant." 267 U.S. at 151. It was the mobility of those vessels (now cars)
which distinguished them from other "effects" under the fourth amendment's
prohibitions. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 366 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959).
26 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
27 Id. at 51.
28 Id. at 52. Justice Harlan vigorously dissented, pointing out that a seizure is indeed
less intrusive than a search, and that a suspect may consent to an immediate search
where he feels the opposite. Where the owners were already in custody, only the
convenience of the police was served by the immediate search, not a sufficient reason
to bypass the magistrate. 399 U.S. at 55-65. See also Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364 (1964); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
29403 U.S. 443 (1971).
30 Id. at 460.
31 Id. at 461 n.18.
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"The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment fades away and disappears." 32
The facts of Coolidge closely parallel both Chambers and Dumas.
Coolidge was arrested and his car "impounded" under authority of an
invalid search warrant,33 his wife was removed from the scene, and his
car towed to the police station for a thorough search two days later. The
delayed search was invalid because although probable cause existed,
exigent circumstances were not present justifying a search without a
warrant, either at the scene or later at the station house. 34 Since the
exigent circumstances of Carroll were absent-no fleeing suspect, no
"fleeting opportunity" to search the car, no contraband or stolen goods
or weapons, 35 no confederates, no inconvenience to police to guard
the vehicle-it was practicable to secure a warrant, and therefore a
warrant was required to validate the search.3 6
Since Coolidge did not overrule Chambers the two must be construed
together, a situation which does little to clarify the car search doctrine, but
does serve to accentuate the major issue. What constitutes circumstances
sufficiently exigent to bypass the warrant requirement?3 7 This determina-
tion by the police officer on the scene is as crucial, if not more so, than
his determination of probable cause. What guidelines exist for him?
People v. Dumas attempted to clear the confusion by ignoring the
Coolidge decision entirely and following an interpretation of Chambers
which puts automobiles in a classification of "effects" inherently possessed
of a diminished expectation of privacy. The Court also examined the
32 Id. at 461.
33 The warrants were not issued by a "neutral and detached" magistrate. Id. at 453.
34 Id. at 464.
35 This singular reference to the "mere evidence" rule is difficult to explain, since the
"mere evidence" limitation on searches has been expressly rejected. Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
36 403 U.S. at 462.
37The following cases, decided under Chambers and Coolidge, found exigent
circumstances to exist. United States v. Bozada, 473 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1973) (atractor trailer which had been under surveillance for nearly two hours, whose owner
was at large, and which reportedly contained contraband). United States v. Menke,468 F.2d 20 (3rd Cir. 1972) (although enough officers were present to watch the
vehicle while a warrant was secured, relatives of defendant not under arrest werepresent, and magistrate was not immediately available); United States v. Pollard, 466F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1127 (1973) (auto parked outside
motel room of arrested person was a "fleeting target"). Compare with United States
ex rel Clark v. Mulligan, 347 F. Supp. 989 (D.N.J. 1972) (warrant required wherebattery of auto was dead). The following pre-Chambers cases did not find exigent
circumstances. United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1960) (auto searched
after defendant detained three hours); United States v. Barton, 282 F. Supp. 785(D. Mass. 1967) (defendant arrested, handcuffed, and in police car with second police
car blocking path of defendant's auto); People v. Lewis, 34 Ill.2d 211, 215 N.E.2d 283(1966) (defendant had been arrested and taken into custody by two officers who
also took possession of vehicle).
[Vol. 7:2
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 7 [1974], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol7/iss2/5
location of the automobile to determine if an increased or decreased
expectation of privacy resulted therefrom,
8 and found the location not
to increase any expectation.
This determination of automobiles as places which carry with them
a diminished expectation of privacy is the first indication that the
California court is not willing to come to grips with the major issue posed
by the juxtaposition of Chambers and Coolidge-what constitutes exigent
circumstances? The nature of the place to be searched is determinative of
a warrantless search's validity only as it bears upon the exigencies
justifying a bypass of the warrant procedure. It is the inherent mobility of
the automobile which, manifested in certain circumstances, creates exigent
circumstances justifying a warrantless search, and not some inherent
expectation of privacy marking automobiles as second-class effects
under the fourth amendment.
39
Upon turning to the issue of exigent circumstances, the court found
them to exist from the presence of the young woman, since the court felt
she was in a position to move the car or destroy the evidence. Faced with
exigent circumstances, the police were thus justified in making an
on-the-spot determination of probable cause, bypassing the magistrate as
impractical. The court sustained the police determination of probable
cause to search the car, relying on the easily movable nature of the
stolen securities, concluding: "When the officers were unable to discover
the bonds in the defendant's apartment, his automobile, parked outside
on the street, quite naturally became an object of strong suspicion.
40
The court's finding that probable cause existed glaringly illustrates
the importance of the exigent circumstances issue, left open by Coolidge
and Chambers. Both the majority and concurring opinions, despite the
complex and circuitous linguistic reasoning of the concurring opinion, in
essence find probable cause as a result of the unsuccessful search of the
described premises and the "surprise" discovery of additional likely
premises. For practical purposes this is not radically different from saying
that a search warrant authorizes the search of almost any non-described
property with which the defendant has had contact, if the search of the
described premises is unsuccessful. The only limits suggested by the court's
opinion are the nature of the contraband and the proximity of the non-
3S People v. Dumas, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 313 (1973).
39 See cases cited note 37 supra. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967): "[Tlhe Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"
40 People v. Dumas, 109 Cal. Rptr, 304, 314 (1973).
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described place, rather vague and elastic limits to be applied at the scene
by police officers. 41 "Probable cause must be shown in each instance."42
This entire issue of probable cause is largely avoided if decided by
a magistrate rather than the police,42 which returns us to the fundamental
question of when the search must be accompanied by a warrant. In
Dumas, the police had the defendant in custody and they had possession
of the defendant's car keys. But for the presence of the young woman, the
car was effectively immobilized, with sufficient officers present on the scene
to guard the vehicle from intrusion. Still, the Dumas decision considered
the presence of this third party sufficient to justify a warrantless search.
However, the very real possibility of destruction of evidence by a
third party existed in Chimel, since Chimel's wife was present at Chimel's
arrest, and police were refused the authority to make a warrantless
search.4 Can Dumas be distinguished simply because an automobile was
involved? Coolidge would indicate not,4 5 and Chimel would indicate that
a separate exception to the warrant requirement where third parties are
present does not exist.4 Such an exception if it did exist would swallow
the warrant requirement, unless very precisely confined.47 Dumas contains
no such confinement, but rather seems to hold that anytime an arrest
occurs with a third party alerted, exigent circumstances exist.
Without the car keys in her possession, was the young woman's
presence an exigent circumstance making the securing of a warrant
impractical? Is the car "mobile" if the officers confiscate the car keys?
Does the car become "mobile" at the moment when the young woman
makes an overt move to tamper with it? Coolidge leaves open these
questions encountered in Dumas, where the auto was not moving or
occupied and under less, though substantial, police control than in
Coolidge. Chambers and Chimel combine to further confuse the issue,
41 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
42 People v. Dumper, 28 N.Y. 2d 296, 299, 270 N.E.2d 311, 312 (1971) (holding that
warrant did not justify search of a car which drove up during search). The statementby Associate Justice Sullivan in his concurring opinion in Dumas that the warrant
was to "search those places over which the defendant had control" is a novel
application of the warrant requirement, and one which if viable at all is presumablylimited by the Chimel "arm's length" rule. 109 Cal. Rptr. at 315. See text accom-
panying note 19, supra.
43 See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.471, 479-80 (1963); LaFave and Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Rolein Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987 (1965).44 See note 19 supra. See also Carrington, Chimel v. California-A Police Response,
45 NoTRE DAME LAW 559 (1970).
45 See text accompanying notes 31 and 32.46See also Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970), particularly Justice Black's dissent
at 40.47 The problems would be similar to those encountered under thC reasonableness
8tandard of Unitd Stats v, Rabinowitz 339 US. 56 (1950).
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with the result that most lower courts, as in Dumas, rely heavily
on Chambers and consider such cars "mobile." ' 48 Chambers, however,
does not stand alone as the law.
Until the Supreme Court re-examines and clarifies the many
conflicting precedents, lower courts will continue to hand down decisions
without clear guidelines, simply ignoring decisions they dissaprove. The
recent auto search case of Cady v. Dombrowski,49 a 5-4 decision with
Justices Brennan, Douglas, Stewart, and Marshall joining in dissent,
indicates that no re-examination or clarification will soon be forthcoming.
Stating that "the decisions of the Court dealing with the constitutionality
of warrantless searches, especially when those searches are of vehicles,
suggest that this branch of the law is something less than a seamless
web," 50 Justice Rehnquist reviewed the past decisions and concluded
that "very little that we might say here can usefully refine the language
of the Amendment itself in order to evolve some detailed formula
for judging cases such as this." 5'
This author must disagree. Instead of blaming the wording of the
fourth amendment for a confusion created by past judicial decisions,
the Supreme Court could recognize a simple yet useful distinction as a
start toward protection of fourth amendment guarantees. The suggestion
is to follow Justice Harlan's dissent in Chambers v. Maroney,52 and allow
a warrantless seizure until a search warrant can be obtained, if probable
cause and exigent circumstances present themselves to officers sufficient
in number to effectuate the seizure of the suspected automobile. Common
experience dictates that being detained is less intrusive than being
searched and bared; effective law enforcement would not be hindered
while individual rights would receive some protection. In Dumas a
seizure would have eliminated the problem of third-party destruction
of evidence, allowed a magistrate to pass on probable cause for a search,
and not inconvenienced the defendant, who was already in police custody.
The real significance of Dumas is that until guidelines are offered
the lower courts, they will continue to grapple inconsistently with the
"seamless web" of fourth amendment auto search, resulting in uneven
application of the law and compromise of fourth amendment guarantees.
Charles Evans Hughes once stated, "We are under a Constitution, but
48 United States v. Bozada, 473 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Pollard,
466 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1127 (1973); United States v.
Leazar, 460 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Miller, 460 F.2d 582
(10th Cir. 1972).
49413 U.S. 433 (1973).
50 Id. at 440.
51Id. at 448.
52 See note 28 supra.
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the Constitution is what the judges say it is."' Regarding the fourth
amendment, the judges are having trouble saying what it is. Every
person's fourth amendment protection suffers as a result.
GORDON D. ARNOLD
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY
OF STATEMENTS TO PAROLE OFFICER-
MIRANDA WARNINGS
State v. Gallagher, 36 Ohio App. 2d 29, 301 N.E. 2d 888 (1973).
T HE OPINION handed down in this recent decision from the Montgomery
County Court of Appeals examined a question of first impression in the
courts of Ohio. The issue presented was "whether a parole or probation
officer is a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Miranda
and thus subject to the Miranda requirements of constitutional warnings
to suspects during custodial interrogation...."'
The defendant, Gallagher, appealed from a conviction of armed
robbery of a 7-11 Store. He was tried without a jury and sentenced to
from ten to twenty-five years in the Ohio State Penitentiary. The state's
prosecuting witness, an employee of the store, was robbed at gunpoint by
two men of approximately $350.00. Although two patrons were also
present in the store at the time of the robbery, neither was able to
corroborate the employee's identification of the defendant. 2 Approximately
one month after the robbery, the defendant was arrested, and immediately
thereafter fully advised of his Miranda rights by the Dayton police. At
that time he executed a standard pre-interview form which listed all his
rights and which constituted an agreement whereby he agreed that any
statements he made thereafter were of his own free will.3 Four days after
the arrest, Mr. William Sykes, a parole officer who had been assigned
to the defendant after his release from prison on a previous conviction,
visited the defendant. During this first visit, the defendant declined to
make any statements concerning his arrest. One week later the defendant
was again visited by Mr. Sykes. During this meeting the defendant admit-
ted to him that he had participated in the robbery in concert with the
other robber. 4 At the trial of this cause, Mr. Sykes was allowed to testify,
53Address before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce, May 3, 1907, in ADDRESSES OF
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 185 (2d ed. 1916).
1 State v. Gallagher, 36 Ohio App.2d 29, 30, 301 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1973).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 32, 301 N.E.2d at 890.
4 Id. at 30, 33, 301 N.E.2d at 889-891.
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